



# Certification More Tangible

Oleg Muravskiy  
Senior Software Engineer, RIPE NCC

MENOG 3, 15 April 2008



# Drivers

- RIR's are implementing a solution to certify resources
  - APNIC and ARIN are implementing an RPKI engine
- Potential IPv4 marketplace: keeping it white
  - Need to be prepared when the stakes go up
  - An IPv4 black market could turn routing into chaos
- RIPE NCC has the task to uphold principles
  - Uniqueness
- Enhanced Registration Services
  - Increasing importance in relation with government, law enforcement...



# Progress since RIPE 55 Meeting

- Focus on business value for RIPE members
- Insight by starting implementation
- The added value of Certification
- Business cases more tangible
- Develop internal business processes to support Certification
- Closer contact with Task force
- More active involvement in technical discussions

# What is the value of a certificate?

Party

Resource

Signature



# What is the value of a certificate?

“Party holds a Resource...”

Party

Resource

Signature





# What is the value of a certificate?

“Party holds a Resource...”

Party

Resource

Signature

“...because RIPE  
NCC said so”



# What is the value of a certificate?

- *Do you believe that RIPE NCC is saying that?*
- *Do you trust what RIPE NCC is saying?*

“Party holds a Resource...”

Party

Resource

Signature

“...because RIPE NCC said so”





# What is the value of a certificate?

- *Do you believe that RIPE NCC is saying that?*
- *Do you trust what RIPE NCC is saying?*

“Party holds a Resource...”

“...because RIPE NCC said so”

Party

Resource


Signature

- Certification only answers the first question
- Certificates are not trust anchors, the registry is!



# It's all about Allocations

- Allocations are RIPE NCC's core concept
- Connect a party to an IP Resource




...and other kinds of parties



# Certificates vs. Allocations

- A certificate is **another representation** of an allocation
- Value of certificates is **only the added value** over other representations

RIPE NCC Internal DB  
RDBMS records



RIPE DB  
RPSL format

cer·tif·i·cate

noun |sər'tifikit|

an official document attesting to a particular

- a document recording a particular marriage, or death.
- a document describing a particular person : *certificate of immunization.*
- a document attesting to a person's position in a course of study or training : *graduate certificate in information technology.*
- a document attesting ~~ownership~~ of a certain item : *a stock certificate.*



holdership



# Added value

- Certificates can be the international exchange standard between RIR's
- Could help automated provisioning
  - easier to prove holdership than through “detective work”
  - certified information in parseable format
- Support resource transfers
- (Long term) Could help future secure routing
  - fills need for a PKI infrastructure and trusted third party



# Certificates are not a prerequisite for:

- Transfer of allocations

- Registry **can** do this without any form of electronic certification
- Transfers have been done already

- Proof of holdership

- Certificates are not the truth, they **only attest** the trust as held by the Registry
- A certificate is only as valuable as the trust in the Registry
- Holdership could be proven in other (non-electronic) ways





Even more tangible...





# Scenario



AS65000



MegaCorp



MiniCorp



10.0.0/21



# Scenario

Please  
route this network  
for me



10.0.0/21



AS65000



MegaCorp



MiniCorp

# Scenario

Please  
route this network  
for me



10.0.0/21



AS65000



MegaCorp

Hmm, is MiniCorp  
**really the holder** of that  
resource?



MiniCorp



# Automated Provisioning

- Provisioning an IP Resource
  - Does Holder **really** hold the resource?
- Checking takes detective work
  - Takes manpower
  - Needs specific knowledge and skills
- Is there an easy and secure way?
  - Meet the Route Origination Authorization (ROA)

# Meet the ROA



“Holder of 10.0.0/21  
authorises AS65000  
to originate this prefix”

- Secure: only true holder can create
- One-sided: states permission of address space holder only
- Multiple ROAs for one prefix allowed



# Relation ROA – Resource Certificate




# Relation ROA – Resource Certificate



MiniCorp's  
resource certificate

# Relation ROA – Resource Certificate



One-time certificate  
(EE certificate)



MiniCorp's  
resource certificate

# Scenario: conversation

Please  
route this network  
for me

  
10.0.0/21



AS65000

**MEGACORP**

MegaCorp

Hmm, is MiniCorp  
**really the holder** of that  
resource?



MiniCorp

# Scenario: conversation

Please  
route this network  
for me



10.0.0/21

Hmm, is MiniCorp  
really the holder of that  
resource?




# MiniCorp

# MEGACORP

# MegaCorp

Okay, please  
sign a ROA  
with my ASN



# AS65000



# Demo Automated Provisioning





# Thank you!

- RIPE Certification Task Force  
<http://www.ripe.net/ripe/tf/certification/index.html>
- APNIC Resource Certification Wiki  
<http://mirin.apnic.net/resourcecerts/wiki/index.php>
- IETF SIDR Working Group  
<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sidr/>